

Message Text

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 01436 01 OF 02 031822Z

47

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 1436

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: MILITARY SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE: RELATIONSHIP
OF CSCE TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE

SUMMARY: CBM SUBCOMMITTEE WORK OVER PAST THREE WEEKS
HAS FOCUSED ON PARAGRAPHS 22 AND 24 OF HELSINKI BLUE BOOK
RELATING TO COMPLEMENTARITY OF POLITICAL DETENTE AND DISARMA-
MENT AND TO RELATIONSHIP OF CSCE TO ONGOING OR FUTURE ARMS
CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. SUBCOMMITTEE HAS REGISTERED VIRTUALLY
NO PROGRESS, LARGELY BECAUSE OF STIFF DOCTRINAL POSITIONS ON
SEVERAL FORMULATIONS TAKEN BY THE SOVIETS ON ONE HAND AND
YUGOSLAVS AND NEUTRALS ON THE OTHER. MEANWHILE, SOVIETS HAVE
CONSULTED US BILATERALLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS ON SEVERAL ISSUES
WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING LANGUAGE WHICH BOTH DELS COULD
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 01436 01 OF 02 031822Z

SUPPORT. SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN KEEN INTEREST IN LANGUAGE THAT

WOULD UNAMBIGUOUSLY BAR INTRUSION OF CSCE FORUM OR PARTICIPANTS IN SALT NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES STATE OF PLAY HERE ON THESE ISSUES, SETS OUT POSITIONS WE PROPOSE TO TAKE, AND REQUESTS DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON SEVERAL SPECIFIC TEXTUAL FORMULATIONS. (SEE PARAS 3B AND 5.) END SUMMARY.

1. FOR WANT OF PROMISING PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF CBM'S, MILITARY-SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HAS CONTINUED WORK ON CSCE RELATIONSHIP TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS (HELSINKI PARA 22 AND 24) FOR LAST NINE MEETINGS, OVER THREE-WEEK SPAN. HOWEVER, WORK HAS BOGGED DOWN OVER A NUMBER OF ISSUES IN COMPROMISE UK TEXT OF DECEMBER 18 (SEE BELOW). MOST OF THESE ARE POINTS ON WHICH ONLY A SMALL MINORITY OF DELEGATIONS HAVE TAKEN UNYIELDING POSITIONS. POLES OF OPINION ARE FOR THE MOST PART THE VIEWS OF NEUTRALS ON THE ONE HAND, IN PARTICULAR YUGOSLAVIA, AND THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT ON THE OTHER, IN PARTICULAR THE USSR. SPECULATION AMONG THE NEUTRALS AND THE ALLIES IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TAKING A TOUGH STANCE ON THIS ASPECT OF CBM ISSUES, AS WELL AS ON THE MORE CONCRETE MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS MEASURES, IN ORDER TO PREPOSITION THEMSELVES FOR AN EVENTUAL ELEVENTH-HOUR BARGAINING SESSION IN WHICH THEY WOULD SEEK A SUBSTANTIAL PARING DOWN OF WESTERN CBM ASPIRATIONS.

2. DESPITE PROTRACTED DISCUSSION, TEXT IN PLAY IN SUBCOMMITTEE IS STILL PATTERNED CLOSELY ON UK DRAFT OF DECEMBER 18. FOLLOWING IS AN ABSTRACT OF THIS TEXT, IN WHICH LESS IMPORTANT ISSUES HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AND THE MORE INTRACTABLE ONES HIGHLIGHTED IN BRACKETS.

"HAVING DISCUSSED THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS RELATED TO THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY IN EUROPE THROUGH BEGIN BRACKETS EFFORTS/JOINT EFFORTS/MULTINATIONAL EFFORTS/EFFORTS AMONG THEMSELVES END BRACKETS AIMED AT PROMOTING DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES, WHEN ENGAGED IN SUCH EFFORTS, (MATTER OF COMMITMENT) BEGIN BRACKETS PROCEED FROM/TAKE INTO ACCOUNT END BRACKETS THE FOLLOWING BEGIN BRACKETS PREMISES/CONSIDERATIONS END BRACKETS:
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PAGE 03 GENEVA 01436 01 OF 02 031822Z

"1. THE (ADJECTIVE) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF BEGIN BRACKETS SECURITY/DETENTE/THESE SUBJECTS/SECURITY AND DETENTE END BRACKETS AND THEIR COMPLEMENTARY NATURE.

"2. THE (ADJECTIVE) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SECURITY OF EACH PARTICIPATING STATE AND, IN THE CONTEXT

OF THESE EFFORTS, SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE.
THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTS, IN THE BROADER
CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY, BETWEEN SECURITY IN
EUROPE AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

"3. COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN STEPS TO PROMOTE DETENTE AND
DISARMAMENT AND THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES
PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE BEGIN BRACKETS WITH DUE
REGARD TO THEIR SOVEREIGN EQUALITY END BRACKETS

"4. ..."

3. THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH COMMENTARY
ON REMAINING ISSUES:

A. INTRODUCTION: FIRST BRACKETED ISSUE IS PRINCIPALLY
BETWEEN SOVIETS AND FRENCH. THE SOVIETS WISH TO EXCLUDE
SALT A PRIORI FROM ALL CONSIDERATIONS IN SUBORDINATE
PARAGRAPHS BY USING THE WORDS "MULTINATIONAL" OR "MULTI-
LATERAL", WHICH IN MOST DICTIONARIES CONNOTE INVOLVEMENT
OF MORE THAN TWO NATIONS. FRENCH ON OTHER HAND RESISTED
THESE TERMS IN INITIAL HELSINKI MEETING AND CONTINUE TO RESIST
THEM NOW, NOT BECAUSE THEY WISH TO INCLUDE SALT, BUT ON THE
GROUNDS THAT EITHER TERM WOULD BE A POINTED REFERENCE TO
THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS, WHICH THEY DISLIKE. MOST OTHERS,
INCLUDING THE US, HAVE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT
"MULTILATERAL" OR ANY OTHER BROADLY ACCEPTABLE PHRASE ALONG
THE LINES OF THE OTHER BRACKETED ALTERNATIVES. SEVERAL
REPS HAVE ASKED US WHY THE SOVIETS ARE SO CONCERNED ABOUT
EXCLUDING SALT FROM THE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
IN THE UK DRAFT TEXT, WHEN THE US HAS NOT SHOWN ANY SIMILAR
CONCERN. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE REPLIED THAT WE CANNOT FATHOM
SOVIET MOTIVES, ANSWER MAY WELL BE DEDUCED FROM QUESTION
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PAGE 04 GENEVA 01436 01 OF 02 031822Z

POSED TO US REP IN CORRIDOR BY GDR: "WHAT IF THE US AND
USSR SHOULD SOMEDAY ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON TACTICAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE?" WE SUSPECT THAT SOVIETS ARE
CONCERNED THAT GENERAL LANGUAGE IN INTRODUCTION AND SUB-
ORDINATE PARAGRAPHS MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE USED BY A THIRD
PARTY TO SOLICIT INFORMATION ABOUT OR ACCESS TO POSSIBLE
BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS IN EUROPE
THAT THE SOVIETS MAY WANT TO PRESS FOR THE FUTURE. WHETHER
OR NOT THIS IS THE SOVIET CONCERN, WE SEE NO NEED TO CHANGE
PRESENT US POSITION (STATE 230739) THAT WE CAN JOIN A
CONSENSUS ON ANY OF VARIOUS EXISTING ALTERNATIVES IN THIS
PARAGRAPH, AS LONG AS THE SUBSEQUENT PARAS ESTABLISH NO
RIGHT OF OVERSIGHT OVER SALT AND MBFR FOR NON-PARTICIPANTS.
SOVIETS INDICATED ON FEBRUARY 27 THEY WOULD CONSIDER "JOINT",
WHICH FRANCE CAN ACCEPT.

B. SECOND AND THIRD SETS OF BRACKETS IN INTRO-
DUCTORY PARA INVOLVE POSITIONS OF US AND WARSAW PACT VS.
THOSE OF NEUTRALS. HOWEVER, SOVIETS AND PACT HAVE BEEN LESS
ACTIVE IN DEFENDING THE SOFTER TERMS IN BRACKETS THAN THE US
HAS. AFTER US STATEMENT IN SUBCOMMITTEE THAT WE COULD
ACCEPT NEITHER "PROCEED FROM" NOR "PREMISES" (STATE 81134
OF 20 APRIL 74), ON GROUNDS THAT EITHER OF THESE WORDS
WOULD IN OUR VIEW IMPLY THAT PARTICIPATION IN ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO START FROM CSCE RULES, CANADIAN
REP GAVE VIEW PRIVATELY THAT WE WERE ISOLATED IN OPPOSING
A COMPROMISE USING ONLY "PREMISES". UK REP IN SUBCOMMITTEE
SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL WORD "FUNDAMENTAL" AS ANOTHER POSSIBLE
COMPROMISE, SO THAT FINAL PHRASE IN INTRODUCTORY
PARAGRAPH WOULD READ: "...TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING
FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS". WE DO NOT PLAN TO COMMENT ON
THIS SUGGESTION UNTIL WE HAVE AN INDICATION WHETHER NEUTRALS
AND WARSAW PACT WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT IT, BUT WE WOULD
APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON WHETHER WE COULD ACCEPT
EITHER "TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING PREMISES" OR "TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS" IF
THERE APPEARS TO BE A GENERAL CONSENSUS ON EITHER OF THESE
FORMULATIONS.

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 01436 02 OF 02 031851Z

47

ACTION EUR-12

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 1436

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C. PARAGRAPH ONE: PREFERENCE OF WESTERN AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES IS FOR THE SINGLE WORD "SECURITY" IN THIS TEXT, WHICH THE SOVIETS IN AN EARLIER VERSION HAD ACCEPTED. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW ARGUING STUBBORNLY AND REPETITIOUSLY IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOR "DETENTE", OR AT THE MINIMUM THE VAGUE TERM "THESE SUBJECTS", FOR DOCTRINAL REASONS THAT OTHERS HAVE SIMPLY NOT BEEN ABLE TO GRASP. WESTERN AND NEUTRAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAVE APPEALED TO THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT "SECURITY" AS THE LOGICAL AND NATURAL WORD FOR THIS TEXT. US REPRESENTATIVE SUPPORTED OTHERS ON THIS POINT IN BILATERAL MEETING WITH SOVIETS ON FEBRUARY 25, OBSERVING THAT SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE ON THIS INNOCUOUS WORD APPEARS AT THIS JUNCTURE TO BE THE BIGGEST ROADBLOCK IN THE WAY OF PROGRESS ON PARAGRAPHS 22 AND 24.

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 01436 02 OF 02 031851Z

D. PARAGRAPH 2: SOVIETS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO BEGIN PARAGRAPH WITH CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE, BUT NEUTRAL AND WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE DRAFTING GROUP REFUSE TO MAKE THIS BOW TO THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY. THE AWKWARD WORDS "IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE EFFORTS" ARE A SOP TO THE SOVIETS, IN RETURN FOR THEIR CONCESSION ON THE ORDER OF THE PHRASES. NO MAJOR ISSUES REMAIN IN THE PARAGRAPH, AND IT MAY BE THE FIRST PART OF THE UK DRAFT TO BE MENTALLY REGISTERED, ALTHOUGH ATTEMPTS TO THIS END FAILED ON FEB. 27.

E. PARAGRAPH 3: THE PRESENT PARAGRAPH EVOLVED FROM THE ORIGINAL NEUTRAL/WESTERN ATTEMPT TO EMBODY THE CONCEPT OF "THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY" IN THE CSCE DOCUMENT. ALTHOUGH THE FINAL BRACKETED PHRASE WAS SUPPORTED BY SOME OF THE NATO ALLIES IN THE 1974 DRAFTING GROUP, AGAINST PACT OPPOSITION, WE FIND THE PHRASE SUPERFLUOUS AND OUT OF CONTEXT, AND WE WILL WORK TACITLY TOWARD HAVING IT DROPPED. THE SOVIETS TOLD US AT A BILATERAL MEETING THAT THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE WORD "COMPATIBILITY". AS PRESENTLY PHRASED, THEY THOUGHT PARA 3 COULD BE SEIZED UPON BY NEUTRAL NON-PARTICIPANTS TO INTRUDE INTO ON-GOING CONSULTATIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD STARTED. AS AN ALTERNATIVE FOR PARA 3,

THEY SUGGESTED: "THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING REGARD FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE WHILE WORKING OUT STEPS TO PROMOTE DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT". IN INITIAL REACTION, US REP GAVE OPINION THAT CURRENT TEXT OF PARA 3 WAS LESS LIKELY THAN THE NEW SOVIET IDEA TO COUNTENANCE INTERFERENCE BY OTHERS IN THE FORMATIVE STAGE OF ANY FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIETS NEVERTHELESS INTRODUCED THEIR NEW PROPOSAL IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEB. 27, AND DREW THE PREDICTABLE, WIDE-SPREAD NEGATIVE REACTION.

F. PARAGRAPH 4: ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF COMPETING TEXTS FOR THIS PARA ARE ON THE TABLE AND NO ATTEMPT HAS YET BEEN MADE TO COMPILE THEM INTO A SINGLE VERSION WITH BRACKETS, SOME ALLIES HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE MALTESE DRAFT TEXT INTRODUCED INTO SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 01436 02 OF 02 031851Z

FEBRUARY 17: "THAT SPECIFIC REQUESTS BY STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE EXPRESSING AN INTEREST IN BEING KEPT INFORMED ABOUT RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANY SUCH EFFORTS, OR IN CONTRIBUTING ON MATTERS IN WHICH THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED, SHALL BE CONSIDERED FAVOURABLY." THE CANADIAN REP IN THE NATO CAUCUS ASKED WHETHER THE MALTESE PROPOSAL MIGHT BE THE BASIS FOR A SUBCOMMITTEE CONSENSUS IF THE BEGINNING WERE MODIFIED TO READ: "THAT SPECIFIC REQUESTS BY ANY STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE TO ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE EXPRESSING AN INTEREST..." THE US REP IN CAUCUS SAID THAT MALTESE FORMULA WITH CANADIAN ADDITION WOULD APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT WITH LIMITING "FEEDBACK" TO BILATERAL CHANNELS, AS AUTHORIZED IN STATE 35345. IN BILATERAL MEETING WITH US ON FEBRUARY 24, HOWEVER, SOVIETS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT MALTESE FORMULATION, EVEN IF MODIFIED, AND ASKED IF US COULD INSTEAD CONSIDER A TEXT RECOGNIZING "THE INTEREST OF STATES PARTICIPATING IN CSCE IN BEING KEPT INFORMED ABOUT RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROCESS OF PROMOTING DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT, AND IN MAKING THEIR VIEWS KNOWN ON MATTERS IN WHICH THEIR SECURITY MAY BE INVOLVED". US REP OBSERVED THAT SOVIET FORMULATION SEEMED TO LEAVE OPEN-ENDED THE QUESTION OF HOW NON-PARTICIPANTS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN, AND MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS AN INVITATION TO APPEAR AT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ELSEWHERE. THE SOVIETS TOOK THIS POINT AND SAID THAT THEY WOULD INSERT THE WORDS "THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS" IN THEIR WORKING FALLBACK TEXT. THEY ALSO AGRRED THAT THE PHRASE "ON MATTERS IN WHICH THEIR SECURITY MAY BE INVOLVED" WOULD BE UNNECESSARY IF "THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS" WERE ADDED. HOWEVER, SOVIET REPS WERE DUBIOUS WHETHER "THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS" WOULD BE SALEABLE TO THE NEUTRALS. SOVIET REP

THEREFORE ASKED WHETHER US COULD CONSIDER INSTEAD THE WORDS
"BY APPROPRIATE MEANS, INCLUDING BILATERAL CHANNELS."
TEXT WOULD THEN READ: "THE INTEREST OF STATES PARTICIPATING
IN THE CSCE IN BEING KEPT INFORMED ABOUT RELEVANT DEVELOP-
MENTS IN THE PROCESS OF PROMOTING DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT,
AND IN MAKING THEIR VIEWS KNOWN BY APPROPRIATE MEANS,
INCLUDING BILATERAL CHANNELS."

5. US REP AGREED TO REPORT THIS SUGGESTION, BUT SAID
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PAGE 04 GENEVA 01436 02 OF 02 031851Z

CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS WOULD NOT ALLOW US TO SUPPORT IT,
IF IT WERE PROPOSED IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE. ALTHOUGH SOVIET
AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH TOLD US IN RECENT LUNCH CONVERSATION
THAT "BY APPROPRIATE MEANS" COULD BE INTERPRETED TO COVER
FORMAL NOTIFICATION OF ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN ARMS
CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT HIS AUTHORITIES THOUGHT
THIS ADDITION UNNUCIOUS, INSERTION OF PHRASE SUGGESTED BY
SOVIETS AT END OF SENTENCE MIGHT APPEAR TO RELATE
MORE DIRECTLY TO "FEEDBACK" THAN TO FLOW OF INFORMATION.
ON OTHER HAND, WE DO NOT BELIEVE US SHOULD BE MORE
RESERVED THAN SOVIETS IN ATTEMPTING TO MEET DEEPLY FELT NEEDS
OF SEVERAL NEUTRAL DELEGATIONS ON THIS ISSUE. TO
BRIDGE DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS IN SUBCOMMITTEE AND STILL
MAINTAIN OUR OWN VIEW THAT BILATERAL CHANNELS ARE THE
"APPROPRIATE MEANS" FOR ANY "FEEDBACK" OF NEUTRAL VIEWS ON
ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, WE BELIEVE WE COULD ACCOMMODATE
SOVIET SUGGESTION IN FOLLOWING REORDERED TEXT: "THE
INTEREST OF STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE IN BEING
KEPT INFORMED AND IN MAKING THEIR VIEWS KNOWN ABOUT
RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROCESS OF PROMOTING DETENTE
AND DISARMAMENT, THROUGH APPROPRIATE MEANS INCLUDING
BILATERAL CHANNELS." IF DEPARTMENT CONCURS, WE WILL
THEREFORE INDICATE TO SOVIETS THAT WE COULD ACCEPT ABOVE
TEXT, WHICH INCORPORATES THEIR SUGGESTION, AND WILL
CONSULT WITH THEM AND WITH ALLIES ON TACTICS AND TIMING
OF USING SUCH A TEXT IN FUTURE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS. DALE

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